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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950332-CA 
v. : 
PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JTOISPICTION ANP NATURE QF PRQCBEPINgg 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(Supp. 1994), violation of spouse abuse protection order, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (Supp. 
1994) and tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 1994), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
X* In sentencing defendant did the trial court correctly 
disregard the prosecutor's shift from recommendations it made in 
the plea agreement? Defendant abandoned his challenge to the 
prosecutor's recommendations at trial. fl [O] rdinarily, [the 
reviewing court] will not entertain an issue first raised on 
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain 
error." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-01 (Utah App. 1992) (same). Because 
the trial court was deprived of the opportunity to consider the 
issue raised on appeal this Court is without findings to review. 
Since, however, the facts are not in dispute, the court must 
determine as a matter of law whether defendant's due process 
rights were violated and whether trial abused its discretion in 
sentencing without regard to recommendations made in the plea 
agreement. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RVLES 
The following relevant statute is appended in full at 
Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Patrick Coco Williams, was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1994) (Count I), violation of a 
spouse abuse protection order, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (Supp. 1994) (Count II) 
and aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp. 1994) (Count III) (R. 10-11). 
Shortly after the events leading to the filing of these charges 
(case no. 941900389FS), defendant pressed his estranged wife, the 
victim in this case, to retract her allegations in support of the 
amended information, and defendant was charged in a separate 
2 
information (case no. 941900619) with tampering with a witness, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 
(Supp. 1994) (Count IV) (R. 92-100, 109). The two cases were 
consolidated (R. 135, 257). 
Following a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty and 
mentally ill to aggravated assault, violation of a spouse abuse 
protection order and witness tampering, and, upon the State's 
recommendation, the trial court dismissed the aggravated burglary 
charge (R. 218-25, 257-61). Thereafter, the trial court 
sentenced defendant on the aggravated assault (Count I) and 
witness tampering (Count IV) charges to zero-to-five year terms 
in the Utah State Prison, and to twelve months imprisonment on 
the violation of a spouse abuse protection order charge (Count 
II), Counts I and IV to be served consecutively to each other and 
concurrently with Count II (R. 230-32). 
SThTtmwr PF THE FACTS 
The charges filed in this case grew out of defendant's 
beating Kerrie Floyd, his estranged wife, on the leg and head 
with a shovel after he had been served with a protective order 
restraining him from being at Ms. Floyd's residence (R. 09). 
Early in the proceedings defendant gave notice of his intent 
to pursue an insanity or diminished capacity defense (R. 38-39, 
133), resulting in his being examined by a number of mental 
health professionals (R. 136-37, 272-76, 288, 301-02). Part of 
the plea bargain defendant negotiated with the prosecutor, Ms. 
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Anne Boyden (R. 257-58), included considerations related to 
defendant's assertions of mental impairment: 
Plea Bargain: The State recommends: (1) that 
the defendant be evaluated at the Utah State 
Hospital pursuant to his guilty and mentally 
ill plea; and (2) that the defendant be 
committed to the Department of Human Services 
for care and treatment, if deemed appropriate 
pursuant to the evaluation at the Utah State 
Hospital, and that the court retain 
jurisdiction, pursuant to § 77-16a-202 (1) (b), 
Utah Code Ann.[;] and (3) that at the 
expiration of the care and treatment provided 
by the Department of Human Services, or if 
such care and treatment is deemed unnecessary 
after the evaluation at the Utah State 
Hospital, the court should recall 
jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence 
pursuant to § 77-16a-202(1)(b) and place the 
defendant on probation; and (4) that the 
defendant shall not be sentenced to prison, 
but the State will recommend that he serve 
one year of jail, without credit for time 
served, as a condition of probation. 
(Plea Agreement, R. 218-225, attached at Addendum B). 
The trial court accepted defendant's plea, noting, however, 
that its following the State's sentencing recommendation was 
"subject to a pre-sentence report, seeing more concerning this 
gentleman," and that it had complete discretion to sentence 
defendant, which defendant acknowledged (R. 259, 263-64). The 
trial court ordered a presentence report and, in accordance with 
the plea agreement, directed that defendant be evaluated at the 
Utah State Hospital prior to sentencing (R. 215-17, 265-66). 
The State Hospital referred defendant for evaluation to Dr. 
Richard Wooten (p. 1) and Eric Nielsen, D.S.W. (P. 1) Dr. Wooten 
found that defendant had a mental illness which could be 
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adequately treated with medications (p. 3)-1 He also found that 
although defendant could probably benefit from treatment at the 
State Hospital, defendant could be treated in jail or prison 
almost as conveniently as in an institution for the mentally ill 
and that he was not uniquely appropriate for treatment at the 
State Hospital due to the limited severity of his illness and the 
availability of other treatment settings (p. 8-9). Dr. Wooten 
also suggested that defendant might also be mildly malingering in 
exaggerating his symptoms in order to avoid being sent to prison 
(p. 7-8). 
Neilsen also found that defendant suffered from a mental 
disorder which could largely be controlled by medication (1) and 
that the State Hospital was not an appropriate treatment resource 
for defendant's problems (p. 2). Neilsen also stated that tests 
revealed a distinct effort by defendant to present himself 
pathologically in order to be seen as someone having a great deal 
of emotional distress and many psychiatric problems (p. 5). 
At sentencing, on April 21, 1995, based on section 77-16a-
202(1)(b) and the State's recommendation, defense counsel, Ms. 
Lisa Remal, asked the trial court to find defendant guilty and 
mentally ill, that defendant be returned to the State Hospital 
for further treatment and that the trial court retain 
1
 The presentence report and the reports of mental health 
examiners Dr. Richard R. Wooten, dated March 26, 1995, Eric 
Nielsen, D.S.W., dated April 3, 1995, and, Vicky Gregory, Ph.D., 
dated April 27, 1995, were supplemented to the record. 
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jurisdiction rather than committing defendant to the Board of 
Pardons (R. 277, 281, transcript of hearing attached at Addendum 
C) . 
Kerrie Floyd, defendant's estranged wife, testified that 
although defendant had a lot of mental problems he had been in 
therapy before and always reverted back: "People tell him to 
take the medication, and he'll take the medication that he's 
supposed to take to play the game, and he'll pretend to play the 
game until he figures he's won" (R. 284). 
Kenneth Updegrove, appearing for Ms. Boyden after having 
conferred with her, moved to submit the sentencing based on the 
presentence report (R. 285) . The Adult Probation and Parole 
evaluator noted that u[t]he Utah State Prison has the capacity to 
handle individuals with this type of behavioral condition," and 
therefore recommended that defendant be sentenced under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1) (a), i.e., that defendant be treated through 
the Department of Human Resources and thereafter transferred to 
the Department of Corrections, precluding the trial court's 
retaining jurisdiction (R. 285-87) . 
Considering the mental health evaluations, the trial court 
noted that defendant had mental problems, but not such problems 
that would have precluded defendant from standing trial (R. 292). 
The court opined that defendant was an irritable type of 
individual who acted out when off his medication (R. 292). 
Therefore, the court found defendant guilty and mentally ill, but 
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refused to retain jurisdiction and ruled that defendant should be 
sentenced to prison for the offenses to which he had pleaded 
guilty (R. 293-95). 
Immediately following the trial court's pronouncement of 
sentence, Ms. Remal asked the court to retain jurisdiction for a 
week in order to discuss with Ms. Boyden what appeared to be a 
change in her sentencing recommendation (R. 295) . In response, 
the trial court granted a one week continuance, retaining 
jurisdiction to amend its sentencing order if so persuaded, and 
ordered that defendant be held in the jail instead of being 
transported to prison (R. 296) . 
On April 28, Ms. Boyden appeared for the State, explaining 
the basis for her sentencing recommendations: that during the 
plea bargain stage defendant appeared so clearly mentally ill 
that she recommended his going to the State Hospital, but that 
she still felt that defendant needed to serve one year in jail 
without credit for time served (R. 300-01, transcript of hearing 
attached at Addendum D); the medical evaluations, however, 
indicated "changed circumstances," including the possibility 
"that the defendant may be exaggerating symptoms if not outright 
malingering," leading her to change her recommendation (R. 301); 
after having spoken with Ms. Remal and read a letter from Vicky 
Gregory, Ph. D., who also examined defendant, her concerns about 
defendant's malingering were assuaged (R. 301-02); but her 
concerns were again reawakened in speaking with the victim, 
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Kerrie Floyd (R. 3 02) . Therefore, given the conflicting claims 
about malingering, Ms. Boyden suggested that defendant be 
sentenced in accordance with section 77-16a-202 (1) (b), i.e., that 
the trial court retain jurisdiction while defendant was treated 
and observed at the State Hospital, after which defendant would 
be returned to the trial court for resentencing (R. 302). 
In response, defense counsel, Robert Steele, recited 
defendant's improvement while under recent treatment and 
medication and stated that defendant did not appear to him to be 
malingering, referring the court to Dr. Gregory's letter (R. 3 03-
05). The trial court noted the split opinions of the evaluators 
and, based on its view of the offense, refused to follow both 
parties' recommendations, reaffirmed its sentencing order, and 
agreed to recommend to the Board of Pardons credit for time 
already served (R. 3 05-07). 
SUMMARY OF ARQUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the 
prosecutor's alleged breach of the plea agreement by abandoning 
it at the continued sentencing hearing. Therefore, this Court 
should not even consider it. In any case, the claim is without 
merit. 
The prosecutor's recommendations in the plea agreement, that 
defendant be committed to the State Hospital, that the trial 
court retain jurisdiction and that defendant be placed on 
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probation, were conditioned on the evaluators' finding that care 
and treatment at the State Hospital was appropriate. They did 
not, partly because defendant might have been malingering. Since 
the agreement was subject to a condition precedent that was never 
satisfied, the prosecutor was not obligated to make the 
recommendations in accordance with the agreement. In fact, the 
prosecutor made the same recommendations agreed to in the plea 
agreement at a sentencing hearing continued for the specific 
purpose of considering defendant's sentencing in light of the 
prosecutor's recommendations. Therefore, defendant's due process 
rights were not violated as a result of what appeared to be the 
prosecutor's change in position after it ceased to have 
obligations under the agreement. In the absence of any due 
process violation, and given that defendant was aware that there 
was no guarantee that the trial court would follow any sentencing 
recommendation, there is no basis for reversing the trial court's 
sentencing order. 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR FULFILLED THE 
CONDITIONS OF THE PLEA BARGAIN, THE 
STRICTURES OF SANTOBELLO V. NEW YORK DO NOT 
APPLY TO THIS CASE 
A. Defendant Abandoned His Challenge to the 
Prosecutor's Recommendations in the Trial Court 
11
 [0] rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an 
issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
9 
circumstances or plain error." State v. Gibbons, 74 0 P.2d 13 09, 
1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-01 (Utah App. 
1992) (same). *The purpose of requiring a properly presented 
objection is to "put [] the judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
On appeal defendant asserts that his challenge to the 
prosecutor's alleged breach of promise was preserved by his 
request for a continuance, citing in support Santobello v. New 
York. 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971). Appellant's Br. at 2 
n.l.2 However, the circumstances supporting the preservation of 
a challenge to the prosecutor's change of position in Santobello 
were substantially different from this case. In Santobello. the 
defendant's due process rights were violated when a prosecutor at 
the sentencing hearing recommended the maximum one-year sentence 
after another prosecutor during plea negotiations had promised 
that he would make no sentencing recommendation. Id. 404 U.S. at 
258-62, 92 S. Ct. at 497-99. In that case, however, the 
defendant "immediately" objected and thereafter unsuccessfully 
sought to adjourn the sentencing in order to prove that the 
2
 Defendant also argues in the alternative that his claim 
has merit under the plain error doctrine or is justified by 
exceptional circumstances. Appellant's Br. at 2 n.l. These 
arguments are entirely unbriefed and should be disregarded. 
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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prosecution had breached its earlier agreement. Id. 404 U.S. at 
259, 92 S. Ct. at 497. See also United States v. D'Iguillont. 
979 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that a breach of a 
plea agreement could not be raised for the first time on appeal 
where the defendant did not object at trial). 
At the conclusion of the April 21 hearing, defense counsel 
requested a continuance in order to discuss with Ms. Boyden her 
change of sentencing recommendation (R. 295-96). However, at the 
April 28 hearing, Ms. Boyden reinstituted the sentencing 
recommendation that she had originally agreed to in the plea 
agreement (R. 3 00-02) . Defense counsel made no objection (R. 
303-06). It is apparent from the record that the trial court 
never considered that defendant was continuing to challenge Ms. 
Boyden's initial shift in her sentencing recommendation because 
the trial court never addressed the issue, the very question for 
which the hearing had been continued. Because defendant never 
gave the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue he now 
raises on appeal, this Court should find the issue waived on 
appeal. See State v. Musser. 110 Utah 534, 548 175 P.2d 724, 732 
(1946) (finding assigned but unargued errors to have been 
"abandoned" and therefore waived), vacated on other grounds. 333 
U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397 (1948). Even if the Court considers 
defendant's claim, it will find it without merit. 
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B. Because a Necessary Condition to the 
Plea Agreement was Unsatisfied, the 
Prosecutor was not Obligated to Make 
the Recommendations in the Agreement 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor reneged on the plea 
agreement by failing to recommend at the sentencing (1) that, as 
per paragraph 2 of the agreement, he be committed to the 
Department of Human Resources, i.e., the State Hospital, for 
treatment with the trial court retaining jurisdiction, pursuant 
to section 77-16a-202(1)(b), Appellant's Br. at 4, and (2) that 
he be placed on probation rather than imprisoned. Appellant's 
Br. at 7. 
Defendant relies exclusively on Santobello. In holding that 
the prosecution had breached the plea agreement, the Supreme 
Court held "that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to 
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." J^ L. 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 498. State v. 
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1976) (citing Sflntokello); 
State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1989) (same). 
However, Santobello has no application to a case in which a 
condition to the performance of the agreement was not satisfied. 
In State v. Clark, the prosecutor agreed not to prosecute if 
either defendant could successfully pass a polygraph examination. 
State v. Clark 675 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 1983). The results of the 
polygraph tests were inconclusive and the prosecutor filed 
charges which led to convictions for aggravated arson. Id. 
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Rejecting the defendants' claim that the agreement had been 
breached, the court held that: "The prosecutor was under no 
obligation when Clark's test was in the inconclusive range since 
no agreement had been reached with regard to inconclusive 
results." j^L. at 560. s&e. filfifi Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 p.2d 
210, 213 (Utah 1988) ("Failure of a material condition precedent 
relieves the other party of any obligation to perforin.") . 
A critical condition to the performance of the plea was 
similarly not satisfied in this case. Paragraph 2 of the plea 
agreement conditions the prosecutor's recommendation for 
commitment to the Department of Human Resources while the trial 
court retains jurisdiction of the case on evaluations from the 
State Hospital, i.e., "if deemed appropriate pursuant to the 
evaluation at the Utah State Hospital" (R. 218). Although one of 
the evaluators, Dr. Wooten, found that defendant could probably 
benefit from treatment at the State Hospital, he specifically 
found that defendant could be treated in jail or prison almost as 
conveniently as in an institution for the mentally ill and that 
he was not uniquely appropriate for treatment at the State 
Hospital due to the limited severity of his illness and the 
availability of other treatment settings (p. 8-9). Neilsen even 
more emphatically stated that the State Hospital was not an 
appropriate treatment resource for defendant's problems (p. 2). 
More importantly, Dr. Wooten suggested that the observed 
extremity in defendant's symptoms might be due to defendant's 
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malingering (p. 8) , a theme Neilsen hinted at in noting 
defendant's distinct efforts to present himself as a pathological 
individual (p. 5). Plainly, the evaluators did not deem it 
appropriate that defendant be committed to the State Hospital. 
Therefore, the prosecutor was under no obligation to proceed with 
its original sentencing recommendations under paragraph 2 of the 
plea agreement. 
Further, because the evaluators found that care and 
treatment through the Department of Human Resources was deemed 
unnecessary, the condition for recalling the trial court's 
jurisdiction and placing defendant on probation, as provided in 
paragraph 3 of the plea agreement (R. 218), was also not 
satisfied (R. 218). Because the critical conditions of the plea 
agreement remained unfulfilled at the April 21 sentencing 
hearing, the prosecutor was under no obligation to make 
recommendations in accordance with the agreement, including those 
regarding probation. Moreover, any recommendation for probation 
under the agreement was premature on April 21, when the period 
for care and treatment to be provided by the Department of Human 
Services had not yet expired. Indeed, defendant appears to 
acquiesce in this conclusion when he states that as a result of 
the prosecutor's "breach" of the agreement, only the "likelihood" 
of probation was altered. Appellant's Br. at 4. 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Breach 
the Plea Agreement 
The prosecutor did not breach the agreement in this case. 
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As noted immediately above, because no obligation to sentence 
defendant in accordance with section 77-16a-202 (1) (b) had yet 
matured, Mr. Updegrove's submitting the State's position upon the 
presentence report did not constitute a shift in position. 
Moreover, Ms. Remal did not object to the prosecution's 
recommendation, but rather only requested a continuance to 
discuss the matter with Ms. Boyden (R. 295). The trial court 
explicitly suspended its sentencing order: 
THE COURT: Yes, I will retain jurisdiction 
for one week in this matter. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: He's to be brought back, and you 
may talk to Ms. Boyden, and I will retain 
jurisdiction to change my mind if I choose 
to, if I am so persuaded. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you. I appreciate that. 
CLERK: Does he still go to prison? 
THE COURT: No, no. Hold him; hold him for 
one week. It's just like a continuance, and 
I granted a continuance. 
(R. 296). Thus, defendant had not yet been sentenced following 
the April 21 sentencing hearing. See State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 
1150, 1151 (Utah App. 1988) (a sentence is not final until 
reduced to writing). 
At the April 28 hearing Ms. Boyden expressed to the trial 
court her reasons, based on the evaluations directed by the plea 
agreement, for seemingly shifting the State's sentencing 
recommendation (R. 300-02). She then tendered to the trial 
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court, in spite of her legitimate concerns about defendant's 
malingering, the same recommendation set out in the plea 
agreement (R. 302): 
But I think again, given the fact that 
there is still this conflicting claim about 
malingering, that perhaps the best way to 
handle that is for the court to follow the 
option in 77-16a-202(b), that the defendant 
be sent back to the State Hospital for a long 
enough period of observation and treatment 
that these issues of malingering or 
exaggerating can be sifted through so that 
the court has a basis for making the 
appropriate sentence. 
The law does allow for that, and perhaps 
that is the best way. Under that section, 
you'd still be retaining jurisdiction, and 
the defendant, at the end of a more extensive 
time spent at the State Hospital, would be 
returned for re-sentencing. 
(R. 302). 
Defense counsel made no objection, other than to argue that 
defendant was improving under medication and did not appear to be 
malingering (R. 303-05).3 
The holding in Santobello was based on "'fairness" and the 
"interests of justice." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 92 S. 
Ct. at 4 98-99. Considering that evaluators had already 
determined that it was necessary that defendant be treated at the 
State Hospital, Ms. Boyden's recommendation in support of 
defendant's wishes, particularly in light of her lingering 
concerns about defendant's malingering, was eminently fair. 
3
 See argument in support of waiver. Appellee's Br. at 9-
11. 
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Finally, the trial court was free to sentence defendant 
apart from any prosecutorial recommendations. In Santobello. the 
Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing or withdrawal of 
the defendant's guilty plea, notwithstanding that the trial court 
expressly stated that it had not relied on the second 
prosecutor's changing his sentencing recommendation. Santobello, 
404 U.S. at 262-63, 92 S. Ct. at 499. &££ also State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Utah 1985)(remanding case upon 
prosecutor's misleading promise even though the trial court 
stated that defendant had been informed that recommendations were 
not binding on the court). Implicit in the Santobello ruling is 
that if there exists no plea agreement or any obligation to 
fulfill recommendations through a failure of a condition, there 
also exists no procedural impediment to the trial court's 
exercising its discretion to sentence a defendant as it chooses. 
In the absence of any due process consideration, the well-
established rule is that the trial court is not bound by any 
recommendation of the prosecutor. Garfield. 552 P.2d at 131; 
State Vt Thurston/ 781 P.2d at 1300. S££ aiSfi Rule 11(g)(2), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (uIf sentencing recommendations 
are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding 
on the court."). 
Following defense counsel's discussing the details of the 
plea agreement with the trial court, the court informed defendant 
17 
that it had complete discretion in sentencing him, which 
defendant acknowledged (R. 263-64) . Therefore, there exist no 
grounds for setting aside defendant's guilty plea. Garfield, 552 
P.2d at 131 ("Where a defendant is aware there is no guarantee 
the court will agree to follow the recommendation of the 
prosecutor, there is no reason to set aside a plea of guilty."). 
In sum, the prosecutor was not required to fulfill the 
sentencing recommendations set out in the plea agreement because 
the evaluators appointed by the Department of Human Resources did 
not find treatment at the State Hospital appropriate, a necessary 
condition for the trial court's retaining jurisdiction and 
defendant's being placed on probation. Any apparent shift in 
position was rendered meaningless by the trial court's continuing 
the sentencing, thereby suspending its sentencing order, followed 
by the prosecutor's submitting its sentencing recommendation as 
stated in the plea recommendation. Therefore, the prosecution 
did not breach the agreement, and consequently, did not violate 
defendant's due process rights. Since defendant was aware of the 
trial court's discretion to sentence him as it chose, there is no 
basis for reversing the trial court's sentencing order. 
18 
CQNCW8IQW 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 74 day of January, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JL^^^^^ 
/ KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MftlLINS 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald S. Fujino and Lisa J.Remal, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this Z>6 day of January, 1996. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1995). Commitment to department. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill 
offender to the department under Subsection 
77-16a-104 (3) (a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and 
order that he be committed to the department for care 
and treatment until transferred to UDC in accordance 
with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and 
order that he be committed to the department for care 
and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until he 
has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At 
the expiration of that time, the court may recall the 
sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender. A 
commitment and retention of jurisdiction under this 
subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order. 
If that specification is not included in the sentencing 
order, the offender shall be committed in accordance 
with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under 
Subsection (1)(b), over the sentence of a mentally ill 
offender who has been convicted of a capital offense. 
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings 
required by this section after the capital sentencing 
proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department 
under Subsection (1)(b), the department shall provide 
the court with reports of the offender's mental health 
status every six months. Those reports shall be 
prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 
77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint an 
independent examiner to assess the mental health status 
of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the 
maximum sentence imposed by the court. Upon expiration 
of that sentence, the administrator of the facility 
where the offender is located may initiate civil 
proceedings for involuntary commitment in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 62A, Chapter 5. 
ADDENDUM B 
RlEBBJSTlinrceUKT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIcB&tyHsTR^ffi"01 
STATE OF UTAH FEB 1 0 1995 
m 
iTWJiECOVMy 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
fefpt'dg- Loco Will iams 
Defendant . 
By. '& 7,'K^ Oepiity Clerk 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER 
Criminal No. QQ (CjOOSZl P$ 
JUDGE Hg-yy^ N mJk>v<Wv 
the defendant COMES NOW, f W u d ^ (j$(fi \l)\\\u^j) 
in this case and hereby acknowledges the following: 
I have entered a plea of .Tguilty* (no contest) to the 
following crime (s) : <t*d tr&x&ijk1^ (JJ 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
A. fafrAAmXJ fc&kAf 
-V7k-5-|Q3 ucfr 
DEGREE 
(KtfxTT^ax. 
and/o^ 
Min. KdllildlULY* 
•) 
B 
• %1(o - T -BoT 
~ 0-5 y\s, fm^ criers 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (±T*£ormatioqL 
against me, I have read i t , and I understand the nature and elements 
of the of fense (s) for which I am pleading fgjj i l tyb « (n o c o n t e s t ) . 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
f o l l o w s : 
A. f^PWA^vM^ fe&u)j ! h a/yvu±b- asrv)iUs\ \>\ MOT (f ^ (h^Ac^o **>t*Lp?^ <n 
bc^ Svur>\ /YAJH/VVS CD W\CL. Ubioi fa puAjn.u- ^Ai/7vu3 bo/dJ^f i^yi^cj . 
ft. U J h ^ ^ ^ T a ^ r ^ ^ ^ fr<U- 0^ ofha*l pocioAi** K fi^W ^ O * ^ 
w
 My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
cr imina l ly l i a b l e , that cons t i tu tes the elements of the crime(s)
 % 
charged are as fo l lows: Qrr\ rnaJhmr- &Jp. 2b IMH (frm\ MryK UMCAAO Sh * 
Sdlf LdJb Q^u^p-\ Stafr nA Uta>h X- $sKk^>$ m\<A h#r^ ^ ofay Ksu/ws hk/w ^AAY^ tap 
h y - Kflvui. Plgvrt AJJI^K <\ Ssncr^r shovel AHMCJV CQJJJ&J VTWMA^J^ NIAKMAU^ 
nutiyca) ^AflkfosfrrvF. Qm PrvwiA 21 ^ )<ta^ X aJi^J bAyu/ -Royf cv> T^ > p k w <w 
O^p A K^ x ^ "AAap" *K^ Ca^ . 
I am entering t h i s / t h e s e p lea(s ) vo luntar i l y and with 
knowledge and understanding of the fol lowing f a c t s : 
1. I know that I have the r ight t o be represented by an 
at torney and that i f I cannot afford one, an attorney w i l l be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condi t ion of my sentence may be to require me t o pay an amount, as 
determined by the court, to recoup the cos t of counsel i f so 
appointed for me. 
- 2 -
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2. I fhave not)) (have) waived my right to counsel, M^ 
I have waived my right to counsel;—I have done so knowing lyr-
infpll i.gontly and vuluritailly lui Lhe following reasons— 
1^ QfflkfakU -
I have read this 
statement and uhderst^atl the ndJyir^and elements of tl^^IiargeSy^Tiy 
rj^hts in thivR-erfcf other proceedings and the^-c5nsequences of irfy plea 
of guiltyOW rrr^rJtMy d* -
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
is fi!^C\.d^a\ WektJ^- Stella and I have had an opportunity 
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
^ 5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish\to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to 
compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to testify in 
. court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn 
against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
-3-
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proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have 
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would 
be paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each offense to which I plead (guilty)), (no contest) . I know thsU: 
«• by pleading—(.guilty) (no contest) hr> an nf fgpgp rhnf cnrrirn a 
minimum mandaLuiy sentence that 1 will be subjecting myself to 
serving a minimum mandatory oontonoo fog that offence. I know that 
the sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, 
or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent 
(85%) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make 
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more 
than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
4-
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12 • I know and understand that by pleading {guilty)) W ov^ rvMi^ M l 
(no contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such 
plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty of%the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. * 
13- My plea(s) is/are the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and 
provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the 
Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. ^ P*y. ^^ • 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of ^guiltyp (no contest) I must do so by filing a motion 
rt&UJl 
within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the court may do are .also not binding on the court. H^we/v^
 f $ 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty,
 %and no promises, except 
those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, have been 
made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
-5-
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am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I am HO years of age; I have attended school 
through the I 6 grade and I can read and understand the English 
language, or an interpreter has buen provided to me. I was not under 
the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s) . 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this 10^ day of fejyUAAA^\ , 19 ^ fT • 
^ 
t 
DEFENDANT ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ftcKtdL, (ca? [Uilha^^j 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
m DEFENDANT/BAR NUMBER TORNEY FOR J
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING "ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against rajr^kcbc. CPCO UUtJbU^w^? # defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on 
-7-
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record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the 
offense (s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of 
the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
)SECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR I 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of (guilty) 
(no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered 
that the defendant' plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the 
charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this /* day of yj^^C^ , 19*7>?. 
ISTRICT JUDGE 
-8-
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ADDENDUM C 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
SCHEDULED SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS 
ORIGINAL 
CASE NO. 941900389 
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 21ST DAY OF APRIL. 
1995. CONTINUING IN THE 8:30 A.M. CRIMINAL CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF 
THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 
SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE. ESQUIRE. DEPUTY COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 363-7900 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
LISA J. REMAL. ESQUIRE. SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, 424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111 TELEPHONE 532-5444 APPEARING WITH A2JD ON£SiALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT. I S f c . L x L / 
JUN 3 0 1995 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
8411/16+17 
INDEX 
APRIL 21, 1995 
ACTIVITY LINE PAGE 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION BY MS. REMAL 14 2 
COMMENTS FROM VICTIM 22 13 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION BY MR. UPDEGROVE 12 15 
SENTENCING BY THE COURT 3 23 
COURT TO RETAIN JURISDICTION FOR ONE WEEK 7 27 
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1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
2 HAD IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE 
3 DEFENDANT:) 
4 THE COURT: THE STATE OF UTAH VERSUS PATRICK 
5 COCO WILLIAMS. COUNSEL, I NOTICE THAT WE HAVE TWO FILES ON 
6 THIS. ARE WE DOING BOTH OR ONE? 
7 MS. REMAL: BOTH CASES, YOUR HONOR. ACTUALLY 
8 YOU GRANTED THE STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE CASES, SO 
9 ALTHOUGH THERE ARE TWO FOLDERS, I THINK THEY'RE UNDER ONE 
10 CASE NUMBER NOW. 
11 THE COURT: THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR SENTENCING, 
12 COUNSEL. IS THERE ANY LEGAL REASON WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT 
13 BE IMPOSED? 
14 MS. REMAL: NONE THAT I'M AWARE OF, YOUR HONOR. 
15 THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED. 
16 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, WE'RE ASKING THE COURT 
17 TO, BY AND LARGE, FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION THAT WAS MADE 
18 BY THE STATE IN THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. 
19 MS. BOYDEN, WHO IS HANDLING THE CASE FOR THE 
20 STATE INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT MR. WILLIAMS SHOULD BE 
21 PLACED ON PROBATION, THAT HE SHOULD RECEIVE APPROPRIATE 
22 TREATMENT AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL, IF THAT IS DEEMED 
23 APPROPRIATE; AND SHE'S RECOMMENDING ONE YEAR IN JAIL WITH 
24 CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
25|| WE'RE HOPING THAT THE COURT MIGHT DEVIATE 
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1 FROM THAT PART OF THE RECOMMENDATION, BUT WE ARE HOPING 
2 THAT THE COURT WILL PLACE HIM ULTIMATELY ON PROBATION. 
31 YOUR HONOR, MR. WILLIAMS HAS BEEN AT THE UTAH 
4 STATE HOSPITAL FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS TO RECEIVE AN 
5 EVALUATION PURSUANT TO HIS PLEA OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL. 
6 I BELIEVE THE COURT HAS BEEN SENT THOSE 
7 EVALUATIONS FROM TWO DOCTORS. I'VE BEEN SENT THOSE AS WELL. 
8 YOUR HONOR, IT SEEMS THAT THE DOCTORS AT THE 
9 HOSPITAL, AS WELL AS THE DOCTORS WHO PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED 
10 MR. WILLIAMS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS CASE HAVE ALL 
11 AGREED THAT MR. WILLIAMS DOES SUFFER FROM MENTAL ILLNESS, 
12 AND THEY ALL SEEM TO AGREE THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM OF MR. 
13 WILLIAMS' MENTAL ILLNESS IS A BIPOLAR DISORDER AS IS TALKED 
14 ABOUT IN THOSE REPORTS AND OTHER REPORTS THAT HAVE 
15 PREVIOUSLY BEEN GIVEN TO THE COURT IN THESE CASES. 
16 MR. WILLIAMS HAS BEEN PLACED ON VARIOUS 
17 MEDICATIONS. I HAVE SEEN MR. WILLIAMS AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING 
18 THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE, AND I KNOW FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH 
19 HIM AND FROM OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HIM THAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 
20 MAKE THAT THE MEDICATIONS HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED 
21 ALONG THE WAY. 
22 THEY HAVE TRIED DIFFERENT MEDICATIONS, 
23 DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS, DIFFERENT LEVELS. THERE WAS, FOR 
24 INSTANCE, MORE THAN ONE PERIOD OF TIME WHERE THE PARTICULAR 
25 LEVEL OF MEDICATIONS CAUSED MR. WILLIAMS PHYSICALLY TO SHAKE. 
3
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I REMEMBER HIS HANDS SHAKING. 
AND HE INDICATED THAT ONCE THEY ADJUSTED THE 
LEVEL OF THAT MEDICATION, THAT WENT AWAY. SO I KNOW THAT 
THERE HAS BEEN SOME HARD WORK DEALING WITH THOSE 
MEDICATIONS, AND CLEARLY IT'S MADE A DIFFERENCE IN MR. 
WILLIAMS. 
HE HAS INDICATED TO ME THAT HE HIMSELF FEELS 
VERY DIFFERENT NOW THAT HE'S ON THE MEDICATIONS. HE ASKED ME 
ONE TIME A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO IF HE SEEMED DIFFERENT TO ME, 
AND I INDICATED TO HIM THAT INDEED HE DID. 
I INDICATED TO HIM THAT HIS WAY OF DEALING WITH 
HIS ATTORNEYS AND HIS WAY OF DEALING WITH THE CASE BETWEEN 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CASE AND THIS TIME, SOME FOURTEEN MONTHS 
LATER, HAS DIFFERED VERY GREATLY, AND I BELIEVE THAT IS DUE TO 
THE FACT THAT HIS MENTAL ILLNESS HAS BEEN DIAGNOSED AND THAT 
HE'S BEEN PLACED ON APPROPRIATE MEDICATION AND HE'S BEEN ABLE 
TO DEAL WITH THE CASE IN A MUCH MORE REASONABLE FASHION, IN A 
MUCH CALMER FASHION. 
I THINK THAT IS PROBABLY THE SAME KIND OF 
SITUATION THAT WILL HAPPEN IN HIS LIFE IN GENERAL, THAT THE 
MEDICATION IS ABLE TO CALM HIM, IS ABLE TO HELP HIM EXERCISE 
BETTER JUDGMENT. 
THE DOCTORS WHO DID AN EVALUATION ON MR. 
WILLIAMS FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEGREE, AT THE TIME OF THE 
OCCURRENCE THAT GAVE RISE TO ALL OF THIS-AND THAT IS THE 
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1 ASSAULT ON MS. FLOYD, HIS EX-WIFE-THAT HIS NOT BEING ON 
2 MEDICATION AT THAT TIME, THEIR SUGGESTION WAS THAT THAT WAS 
3 VERY LIKELY TO HAVE INFLUENCED HIS BEHAVIOR AND INFLUENCE HIS 
4 JUDGMENT. 
5 I FOR ONE, AND I KNOW MR. WILLIAMS FOR ANOTHER, 
6 IS GLAD THAT THIS HAS BEEN DISCOVERED, BECAUSE HE, FOR A LONG, 
7 LONG TIME, HAS WANTED TO UNDERSTAND WHY HE HAS THESE 
8 PERIODS OF TIME WHEN HE JUST SEEMS UNABLE TO CONTROL WHAT HE 
9 DOES AND WHAT'S GOING ON AROUND HIM. 
10 YOUR HONOR, I CERTAINLY DON'T WANT TO IN ANY 
11 WAY DIMINISH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION OR IN ANY WAY 
12 DIMINISH MS. FLOYD'S FEELINGS ABOUT THIS. 
13 I KNOW SHE'S PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM, SHE HAS 
14 MADE SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENTS TO THE PRE-SENTENCE 
15 INVESTIGATOR, AND I KNOW THAT THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY HAS 
16 TALKED WITH HER AT LENGTH ABOUT THE CASE. 
17 AND FRANKLY IT'S VERY UNDERSTANDABLE THAT 
18 SHE'S FEARFUL AND THAT THIS HAS TRAUMATIZED HER. 
19 I THINK CERTAINLY ANYBODY IN THAT SITUATION 
20 WOULD BE FEARFUL. WHAT I HOPE THE COURT UNDERSTANDS, 
21 HOWEVER, IS THAT SINCE THE DATE THIS OCCURRED AND TO THE 
22 PRESENT TIME, MR. WILLIAMS' SITUATION HAS CHANGED GREATLY, AND 
23 THAT IS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A DIAGNOSIS OF THIS PROBLEM. 
24 THERE HAS BEEN MEDICATION WHICH HAS 
25 SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED HIS APPROACH AND CHANGED HIS OUTLOOK 
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1 ON LIFE, AND I THINK IT'S GOING TO MAKE A GREAT, GREAT 
2 DIFFERENCE IN HIS FUTURE AS WELL. 
3 YOUR HONOR, THE COURT REALLY HAS TO MAKE TWO 
4 DECISIONS HERE TODAY. ONE IS WHETHER OR NOT HE QUALIFIES FOR 
5 THE STATUS OF "GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL," AND THE SECOND IS IN 
6 WHAT WAY TO SENTENCE HIM. 
7 YOUR HONOR, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH, ON 
8 THE CURRENT MEDICATIONS, HE IS NOT DEEMED TO BE A PERSON WHO 
9 IS DANGEROUS TO HIMSELF AND OTHERS, I THINK THAT'S ACCURATE, 
10 BUT WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE MENTAL ILLNESS ITSELF HAS 
11 CAUSED, AT LEAST IN THIS ONE INCIDENT WITH MS. FLOYD, HIM TO BE 
12 DANGEROUS. 
13 AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MAKING A FINDING THAT 
14 HE DOES QUALIFY FOR GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL STATUS DOES 
15 LEAVE OPEN THE OPTION IN THE FUTURE OF TREATMENT AT THE STATE 
16 HOSPITAL, WHERE THAT OPTION IS NOT AVAILABLE IF THAT FINDING IS 
17 NOT MADE. 
18 SO IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE COURT MAKES THAT 
19 FINDING, IT MEANS THAT SHOULD HIS MEDICATION NEED TO BE 
20 ADJUSTED AGAIN, SHOULD THERE NEED TO BE SOME FURTHER 
21 EVALUATION, THAT THAT WILL THEN BE POSSIBLE, BECAUSE THE STATE 
22 HOSPITAL OPTION WILL BE AVAILABLE, AND IT WON'T BE IN ANY OTHER 
23 WAY. 
24 THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME DIFFERENCE OF OPINION 
25 J BETWEEN THE TWO DOCTORS WHO EVALUATED HIM AT THE HOSPITAL, 
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1 ONE BEING DR. WOOTEN AND ONE BEING DR. NIELSEN I BELIEVE IT WAS. 
2 DR. NIELSEN'S OPINION SEEMS TO BE THAT, GIVEN MR. 
3 WILLIAMS' STABILITY ON MEDICATION, THE STATE HOSPITAL REALLY 
4 HAS DONE ABOUT ALL THEY CAN DO FOR HIM AT THIS TIME. 
5 DR. WOOTEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, INDICATES THAT 
6 HE THINKS THAT MR. WILLIAMS WOULD PROBABLY BENEFIT FROM 
7 SOME FURTHER TREATMENT AT THE HOSPITAL, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT 
8 OF THIS BEING A FAIRLY NEW DIAGNOSIS, AND HIS NOT HAVING 
9 RECEIVED ANY SUBSTANTIAL TREATMENT IN THE PAST. 
10 AND YOUR HONOR, MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE STATE 
11 HOSPITAL IS THAT ONE OF THE ISSUES THEY'RE PARTICULARLY GOOD 
12 AT DEALING WITH ARE THE MEDICAL ISSUES, BECAUSE OF COURSE 
13 THEY HAVE THE MEDICAL DOCTORS AND PSYCHIATRISTS THERE AS 
14 WELL AS THE PSYCHOLOGISTS WHO CAN WORK WITH THAT AND 
15 OBSERVE WHAT KIND OF DIFFERENCES AND ADJUSTMENTS IN 
16 MEDICATION NEED TO BE EFFECTUATED AND WORK WITH AN 
17 INDIVIDUAL IN TRYING TO GET EXACTLY THE RIGHT MEDICATION AND 
18 THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF VARIOUS MEDICATIONS SO THAT THEY CAN GET 
19 THE BEST RESULTS POSSIBLE. 
20 SO I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO CONSIDER THOSE 
21 OPINIONS CAREFULLY, AND IF YOU DEEM THAT MR. WILLIAMS COULD 
22 BENEFIT FROM SOME MORE TREATMENT AT THE HOSPITAL, AS DR. 
23 WOOTEN SUGGESTED, THAT IN FACT WE DO ORDER THAT HE BE SENT 
24 BACK TO THE HOSPITAL AND GIVEN WHATEVER TREATMENT THEY 
25 THINK IS APPROPRIATE. 
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1 AS YOU KNOW, THE STATUTE ALLOWS THE COURT TO 
2 RETAIN JURISDICTION OF THE MATTER ONCE A FINDING OF GUILTY AND 
3 MENTALLY ILL IS MADE UPON THE HAPPENING OF WHICH EVER OCCURS 
4 FIRST: MR. WILLIAMS OR THE DEFENDANT, BEING BROUGHT BACK TO 
5 THE COURT UNDER TWO EVENTS; AND THOSE EVENTS ARE THAT THERE 
6 IS EITHER THE PASSAGE OF EIGHTEEN MONTHS, OR NOTIFICATION FROM 
7 THE STATE HOSPITAL THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT THE PARTICULAR 
8 PATIENT HAS REACHED MAXIMUM BENEFIT. 
9 MY GUESS IS, YOUR HONOR, BASED ON THE 
10 INFORMATION FROM THE TWO DOCTORS, THAT EVEN SHOULD THE 
11 COURT SEND MR. WILLIAMS BACK TO THE HOSPITAL, IT'S VERY LIKELY 
12 THAT HE WILL HAVE REACHED MAXIMUM BENEFIT BEFORE THE 
13 EXPIRATION OF EIGHTEEN MONTHS, AND THAT'S JUST A GUESS ON MY 
14 PART. 
15 BUT GIVEN THE FACT THAT THEY'RE WORKING WITH 
16 HIS MEDICATIONS AND PROBABLY CAN GET THAT ACCOMPLISHED 
17 BEFORE THAT EIGHTEEN MONTHS HAS EXPIRED, THAT'S MY GUESS. 
18 YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD ASK THE COURT TO RETAIN 
19 JURISDICTION OF THE CASE AS OPPOSED TO ALLOWING THE BOARD OF 
20 PARDONS TO TAKE CHARGE OF THAT, ONCE HE HAS RECEIVED 
21 MAXIMUM BENEFIT AT THE STATE HOSPITAL. THAT IS CONSISTENT 
22 WITH THE JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF BOTH THE STATE AND THE 
23 DEFENSE AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA. 
24 MS. BOYDEN AND I DISCUSSED WHAT WE WERE 
251 HOPING THE COURT WOULD DO, AND I DO THINK ITS ALSO CONTAINED 
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1 IN THE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT AS WELL. 
2 IT'S OUR FEELING THAT YOUR HONOR, HAVING SPENT 
3 A LOT OF TIME PRESIDING OVER THIS CASE, HAVING REVIEWED THE 
4 VARIOUS EVALUATIONS THAT HAVE GONE ON IN THE CASE, AND 
5 HAVING OBSERVED MR. WILLIAMS, AND HAVING UNDERSTOOD THE INS 
6 AND OUTS OF THE CASE, THAT YOU WOULD BEST BE ABLE TO MAKE AN 
7 APPROPRIATE DECISION ABOUT WHAT THE SENTENCE OUGHT TO BE. 
8 YOUR HONOR, AS THE REPORT INDICATES, MR. 
9 WILLIAMS HAS BEEN INCARCERATED FOR A LONG TIME NOW. HE WAS 
10 FIRST ARRESTED IN FEBRUARY OF 1994, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY. I 
11 KNOW THAT IT'S BEEN ABOUT FOURTEEN MONTHS. 
12 IT'S OUR HOPE THAT SOMETIME IN FUTURE, THE 
13 COURT WILL BE PLACING MR. WILLIAMS ON PROBATION, AND PERHAPS 
14 NOT REQUIRING FURTHER INCARCERATION. 
15 I KNOW THAT THE STATE HAS RECOMMENDED A YEAR 
16 WITHOUT CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED, AND MR. WILLIAMS IS WILLING TO 
17 ACCEPT WHATEVER IT IS THE COURT THINKS IS APPROPRIATE. 
18 BUT HE FEELS AS THOUGH ONCE HIS MEDICATION 
19 SITUATION IS COMPLETELY STABILIZED, AND THE DOCTORS TREATING 
20 HIM FEEL AS THOUGH HE'S GONE AS FAR AS HE CAN IN THAT AREA, 
21 THAT IN FACT HE WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE FOR 
22 PROBATION. 
23 ONE OF THE THINGS ABOUT PROBATION, OF COURSE, IS 
24 THAT THERE ALL KINDS OF COUNSELING PROGRAMS AND TREATMENT 
25 OPTIONS AVAILABLE. SHOULD HE CONTINUED TO BE INCARCERATED, 
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1 OF COURSE, THERE IS VERY LIMITED IF ANY REAL TREATMENT 
2 AVAILABLE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A STRICT TYPE OF PROBATION, 
3 MAYBE ISP PROBATION, MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE INITIALLY TO GIVE MR. 
4 WILLIAMS THE TYPE OF STRUCTURE THAT HE NEEDS. 
5 AND IN FACT HE'S BEEN ON ISP PAROLE PREVIOUSLY, 
6 AND BACK EARLIER IN THE CASE I WAS ABLE TO GET HOLD OF THE 
7 PAROLE DOCUMENT, THE COMPLETE FILE BASICALLY ABOUT HIM, AND I 
8 THINK THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE FACT THAT WHEN HIS MENTAL 
9 ILLNESS WASN'T ACTIVE IN THE PAST, HE REALLY DID QUITE WELL. 
10 AND I'M QUOTING FROM A 1989, JANUARY 4TH TERMINATION OF PAROLE 
11 AND SENTENCE REPORT FROM DEAN GODFREY WHO WAS AT THAT TIME 
12 HIS AGENT. 
13 HE TALKS ABOUT THE VARIOUS TIMES THAT HE'S BEEN 
14 ARRESTED AND BEEN PAROLED, AND HE TALKS ABOUT-SAYS THIS AT 
15 THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH: 
16 DURTNG THE PERIOD OF TIME MR. WILLIAMS HAS 
17 BEEN SUPERVISED ON HIS SECOND PAROLE, HE 
18 HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF ANY KNOWN NEW 
19 CRIMES. SEVERAL URINES RECENTLY HAVE 
20 BEEN TAKEN AND HE HAS TESTED NEGATIVE ON 
21 ALL OF THESE TESTS. HE'S ALSO MAINTAINED 
22 STEADY EMPLOYMENT WHILE ON PAROLE. 
23 ITS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE STAFF OF 
24 THE ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE THAT MR. 
25|| WILLIAMS' PAROLE BE TERMINATED 
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I SUCCESSFULLY. 
21 IN ANOTHER REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 27TH OF '89, WHEN THERE WAS 
3 AN ALLEGATION THAT EVENTUALLY WAS DISMISSED AS TO A PAROLE 
4 REVOCATION, MR. GODFREY AGAIN HAS THIS TO SAY, AT THE END OF 
5 THAT REPORT: 
6 PRIOR TO HIS CURRENT INCARCERATION, MR. 
7 WILLIAMS HAD BEEN SUPERVISED ON PAROLE 
8 WITHOUT ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW. IT 
9 APPEARED AS IF HE HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE 
10 EFFORTS TO PUT HIS PAST CRIMINAL LIFESTYLE 
11 BEHIND HIM. SHOULD THE NEED FOR PAROLE 
12 ARISE IN THE FUTURE, IT IS FELT THAT MR. 
13 WILLIAMS WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT 
14 CANDIDATE FOR PAROLE. 
15 NOW I GRANT YOU, YOUR HONOR, THERE WERE SOME PROBLEMS AFTER 
16 THAT, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THIS CASE. 
17 BUT WHAT I THINK WHAT THIS MEANS TO ME IS THAT, 
18 AS WITH ANY PERSON WITH A MENTAL ILLNESS, THERE ARE TIMES 
19 THAT A PERSON'S MENTAL ILLNESS SEEMS TO BE SORT OF IN 
20 REMISSION, AND A TIME WHEN ITS ACTIVE. 
21 AND THIS MEANS TO ME THAT MR. WILLIAMS 
22 CERTAINLY HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DOING VERY WELL IN PROBATION, 
23 AND HE HAS IN FACT BEEN ABLE TO DO THAT. 
24 AND MY GUESS IS THAT THE PROBLEMS HE HAD 
25 ALONG THE WAY WERE DUE LARGELY OR COMPLETELY TO HIS MENTAL 
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1 ILLNESS WHEN IT BECAME ACTIVE. HE WASN'T DIAGNOSED, HE WASN'T 
2 BEING TREATED FOR IT. 
3 YOUR HONOR, IN SUMMARY, SO THAT THE COURT 
4 UNDERSTANDS WHAT IT IS WE ARE ASKING THE COURT TO DO, WE'RE 
5 ASKING YOU TO MAKE A FINDING THAT MR. WILLIAMS IS AND DOES 
6 QUALIFY FOR THE STATUS OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL. 
7 IF THE COURT THINKS IT'S APPROPRIATE, WE WOULD 
8 ASK THAT YOU RETURN HIM TO THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL FOR 
9 FURTHER TREATMENT AS DR. WOOTEN SUGGESTS MIGHT BE 
10 APPROPRIATE, AND THAT THE COURT RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THAT 
11 SO THAT WHEN HE HAS REACHED MAXIMUM BENEFIT, HE'LL BE 
12 RETURNED TO THIS COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
13 IT'S FURTHER OUR REQUEST THAT YOU PLACE MR. 
14 WILLIAMS ON PROBATION, THAT AT THE TIME OF HIS RETURN FROM 
15 THE STATE HOSPITAL, WHEN HE'S REACHED MAXIMUM BENEFIT, THAT 
16 THE COURT AT THAT TIME CONSIDER WHAT IF ANY FURTHER JAIL TIME 
17 IS APPROPRIATE. 
18 CERTAINLY THE CONDITION OF PROBATION WOULD 
19 NECESSARILY HAVE TO INCLUDE CONTINUED TREATMENT, CONTINUED 
20 MEDICATION AS IS PRESCRIBED BY THE APPROPRIATE DOCTORS, AND 
21 ANY OTHER TYPE OF MENTAL HEALTH OR OTHER TREATMENT THAT IS 
22 DEEMED APPROPRIATE. 
23 IT SHOULD PROVIDE THAT HE WORK FULL TIME, AND 
24 HE DOES HAVE, AS INDICATED IN COURT A VERY GOOD WORK HISTORY. 
251 I HAVE SPOKEN WITH JOHN NAMBA WHO HAS 
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1 EMPLOYED HIM FOR YEARS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND HE HAS 
2 ALWAYS SAID TO ME THAT PATRICK IS A VERY, VERY GOOD EMPLOYEE, 
3 A VERY RELIABLE WORKER. HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN HAPPY TO 
4 WELCOME PATRICK BACK INTO HIS EMPLOY, AND HAS INDICATED TO 
5 ME AT TIMES THAT IF PATRICK EVEN NEEDS A PLACE TO RESIDE, HE 
6 COULD RESIDE WITH THE NAMBA FAMILY. 
7 THAT CONFIDENCE IN MR. WILLIAMS* ABILITIES IS 
8 EVIDENT, AND SO CERTAINLY A FULL-TIME JOB, IF HE HAD ONE HE 
9 COULD BEGIN TO PAY RESTITUTION THAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. I 
10 KNOW HE CAN GET RIGHT BACK TO WORK. 
11 THE COURT: WHERE IS THE STATE? 
12 MR. UPDEGROVE: MAY WE HAVE THE VICTIM SPEAK, 
13 YOUR HONOR? 
14 THE COURT: SIR, IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WISH TO 
15 STATE IN YOUR OWN BEHALF? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: NO, SIR. 
17 MR. UPDEGROVE: AND I MEANT THE VICTIM. 
18 THE COURT: OH, THE VICTIM. IS SHE HERE? 
19 VICTIM: YES. 
20 THE COURT: YOU MAY STEP FORWARD. WELL DONT-
21 THAT'S FINE. YOU MAY PROCEED. 
22 VICTIM: WELL, I'M NOT HAPPY WITH THE SITUATION 
23 HERE. I BELIEVE HE SHOULD GET A SENTENCING THAT WAS 
24 ORIGINALLY STARTED. GOD-HE GETS TO GO TO TREATMENT. OKAY? 
25 AND I'M IN TREATMENT MYSELF, TOO. BUT I HAVE TO PAY FOR THIS. 
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1 I'M THE ONE THAT HAS TO LIVE WITH THIS FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE. 
2 I'M THE ONE THAT BEARS THE SCARS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE TRYING TO 
3 GET MY LIFE BACK TOGETHER. 
4 I LIVE IN FEAR EVERY TIME I HEAR THAT THIS MAN IS 
5 EVEN OUT SOMEWHERE. I GET A REPORT BACK FROM THE STREET, 
6 LITTLE SNIDE REMARKS, AND I JUST WANT HIM TO DO HIS TIME AND BE 
7 TAKEN OUT OF THE STATE AND AWAY FROM ME FOREVER. HE 
8 TRAUMATIZED MY FAMILY. 
9 THE COURT: YOU SAY REPORTS, SNIDE REMARKS. 
10 WHAT ARE YOU SAYING, MA'AM? 
11 VICTIM: JUST HOW I HEAR LITTLE THINGS FROM JAIL. 
12 THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU HEAR? 
13 VICTIM: CERTAIN THINGS. 
14 THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU HEAR? 
15 VICTIM: THAT HE WANTS TO DO AWAY WITH ME LIKE 
16 O.J. DID WITH HIS WIFE AND BOYFRIEND. HE HAS CONTACTED MY 
17 HOUSE TWICE SINCE HIS INCARCERATION, WHICH HE WAS ASKED NOT 
18 TO, AND HE HAS DONE IT THROUGH MY GRANDSON, WHICH IS NOT HIS 
19 GRANDSON. MY DAUGHTER HAS A CHILD. THE WHOLE THING IS NOT 
20 FAIR. 
21 I DIDN'T HAVE A CHOICE TO BARTER AND TO DECIDE 
22 WHETHER OR NOT I WANTED TO GET BEAT BY A SNOW SHOVEL. I 
23 DIDN'T GET TO PLEA BARGAIN WHETHER I WANTED TO GET SLAPPED OR 
24 HIT WITH A SNOW SHOVEL. HE GETS TO PLEA BARGAIN FROM 
25|| ATTEMPTED MURDER DOWN TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, BUT MY LIFE IS 
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1 THE ONE THAT HE TRIED TO TAKE. 
2 AND I DON'T FEEL SORRY. THE MAN IS A ROLLER 
3 COASTER. GRANTED HE'S HAD A LOT OF MENTAL PROBLEMS, BUT AS 
4 SOON AS ALL THIS IS OVER, HE'S GOING TO REVERT BACK TO THE SAME 
5 PERSON THAT HE WAS BEFORE. HE'S BEEN IN CALIFORNIA, HE'S BEEN IN 
6 THERAPY, AND HE ALWAYS REVERTS BACK. 
7 PEOPLE TELL HIM TO TAKE THE MEDICATION, AND 
8 HE'LL TAKE THE MEDICATION THAT HE'S SUPPOSED TO TAKE TO PLAY 
9 THE GAME, AND HE'LL PRETEND TO PLAY THE GAME UNTIL HE FIGURES 
10 HE'S WON. 
U THE COURT: THANK YOU, MA'AM. THE STATE? 
12 MR. UPDEGROVE: YOUR HONOR, THE 
13 REPRESENTATION WAS CORRECT AS TO WHAT MS. BOYDEN 
14 REPRESENTED. I TALKED TO MS. BOYDEN AT LENGTH THIS MORNING, 
15 AND SHE DID GO OVER THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND IN THE PRE-
16 SENTENCE REPORT IT INDICATES THAT, ON THE PROSECUTION'S 
17 STATEMENT, THE LAST LINE, "DUE TO THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF 
18 MENTAL ILLNESS"-. 
19 THE COURT: WHERE ARE YOU, COUNSEL? 
20 MR. UPDEGROVE: ON THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT, 
21 PAGE 6, PARAGRAPH "GOLF." THE LAST SENTENCE. 
22 DUE TO THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF MENTAL 
23 ILLNESS, THE PROSECUTION IS NOT 
24 RECOMMENDING PRISON AT THIS TIME. 
25 SHE UNDERLINED "AT THIS TIME." THE NOTE TODAY, SHE STATES, 
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1 GIVEN THE MOST RECENT EVALUATIONS FROM 
2 THE STATE HOSPITAL INDICATING THAT THE 
3 DEFENDANT'S GRADUATING MENTAL ILLNESS 
4 SYMPTOMS CAN BE TREATED AS EFFECTIVELY 
5 EITHER IN PRISON OR AT THE STATE HOSPITAL, 
6 SHE WANTS TO SUBMIT IT ON THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. AND I HAD 
7 HOPED THAT-. 
8 THE COURT: WHERE DOES SHE GET THIS 
9 INFORMATION THAT HE WOULD DO AS WELL IN PRISON OR AT THE 
10 STATE HOSPITAL? 
11 MR. UPDEGROVE: THE EVALUATOR'S SUMMARY, THE 
12 LAST PARAGRAPH SAYS: 
13 THE UTAH STATE PRISON HAS THE CAPACITY TO 
14 HANDLE INDIVIDUALS WITH THIS TYPE OF 
15 BEHAVIORAL CONDITION; THEREFORE, THE 
16 FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION IS SUBMITTED 
17 TO THE COURT FOR THE COURTS REVIEW. 
18 THE COURT: ARE YOU RECOMMENDING THAT I FIND 
19 HIM GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL? 
20 MR. UPDEGROVE: I THINK UNDER THE CONDITIONS, 
21 MS. REMAL IS RIGHT ON THAT, THAT THAT ALLOWS YOU TO RETAIN 
22 JURISDICTION AND ALLOWS HIM TO GO BACK TO THE HOSPITAL IF 
23 NECESSARY. 
24 THE COURT: ARE YOU RECOMMENDING THAT I RETAIN 
251 JURISDICTION OR THAT THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAVE THE 
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1 RESPONSIBILITY AS SET FORTH HERE IN THE EVALUATION TO WHERE 
2 THEY CAN TREAT HIM JUST AS WELL? 
3 MR. UPDEGROVE: I BELIEVE THE CITATION IS 77-16A-
4 202(1)(A): 
5 SENTENCE THE OFFENDER TO A TERM OF 
6 IMPRISONMENT AND ORDER THAT HE BE 
7 COMMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT-
8 WHICH IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
9 -FOR CARE AND TREATMENT UNTIL 
10 TRANSFERRED TO UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
11 CORRECTIONS. 
12 AND THIS IS WHAT THEY SAY HERE AT THE END OF THEIR 
13 RECOMMENDATION, AND MS. BOYDEN POINTED OUT TO ME, THAT IT IS 
14 ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT PRIOR TO SENTENCING IN THIS CASE, THE 
15 DEFENDANT RECEIVE AN EVALUATION OF MEDICATION AT THE UTAH 
16 STATE HOSPITAL. 
17 SO AS I READ THIS, IF YOUR HONOR RETAINS 
18 JURISDICTION, HE CAN STILL BE SENT TO THE HOSPITAL AND THEN SENT 
19 TO THE PRISON OR JAIL. 
20 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THAT'S CORRECT, IS IT? 
21 MS. REMAL: YES, YOUR HONOR; I BELIEVE IT IS. 
22 THE COURT: I CAN'T RETAIN JURISDICTION IF I'VE 
23 SENT HIM TO THE STATE PRISON. 
24 MS. REMAL: NO, YOU HAVE TWO CHOICES. IF YOU 
25 FIND THAT HE QUALIFIES FOR THE STATUS OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY 
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1 ILL, YOU CAN EITHER SEND HIM TO THE STATE HOSPITAL AND RETAIN 
2 JURISDICTION, IN WHICH CASE AFTER HE'S DONE HE COMES BACK AND 
3 THEN YOU DECIDE WHAT YOU DO FROM THERE. 
4 OR YOU CAN SEND HIM TO THE STATE HOSPITAL AND 
5 NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION, AND IF THAT IS WHAT YOUR CHOICE IS, 
6 THEN HE IS THEN SENT TO PRISON AFTERWARDS AND THE BOARD OF 
7 PARDONS THEN MAKES THE DECISION ABOUT WHAT TO DO THERE. AND 
8 OUR-. 
9 THE COURT: THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING. 
10 MR. UPDEGROVE: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR. THAT'S 
11 THE POINT WHERE IT TALKS ABOUT, "FOR NO MORE THAN EIGHTEEN 
12 MONTHS," YOU CAN RECALL HIM. 
13 THE COURT: NOW COUNSEL, I HAVE PROBLEMS. I 
14 DON'T WANT TO BELITTLE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TWO EXPERTS 
15 IN THIS FIELD. BUT WHEN I READ THAT ONE OF THEM IS A LICENSED 
16 PSYCHOLOGIST AND MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPIST, AND THE 
17 OTHER IS A CSW, WHICH IS A SOCIAL WORKER, WHY HAVEN'T WE 
18 GOTTEN THE EVALUATIONS FROM MEDICAL DOCTORS? 
19 MS. REMAL: THESE ARE DOCTORS, AS I UNDERSTAND 
20 IT, AT THE STATE HOSPITAL, ASSIGNED TO EVALUATIONS TO BE DONE 
21 BY DOCTORS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM, AND THESE ARE TWO 
22 THAT THEY CHOSE. 
23 THE DOCTORS THAT PREVIOUSLY HAVE EVALUATED 
24 MR. WILLIAMS ARE, OF COURSE, DR. VICKY GREGORY WHO IS A PHD 
251 PSYCHOLOGIST, AND DR. MARK RINDFLESH, WHO IS A PSYCHIATRIST. 
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1 AND SO THOSE ARE THE PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS. 
2 THE COURT: WHAT DID DR. RINDFLESH SAY? 
3 MR. UPDEGROVE: THAT'S IN THE PRE-SENTENCE, YOUR 
4 HONOR. 
5 THE COURT: I READ THAT, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER. 
6 MS. REMAL: BOTH OF THOSE DOCTORS, YOUR HONOR, 
7 INDICATE IN FACT THAT MR. WILLIAMS WAS SUFFERING FROM MENTAL 
8 ILLNESS. DR. RINDFLESH INDICATED HIS DIAGNOSIS WAS BIPOLAR 
9 AFFECTIVE DISORDER, OR PERHAPS SCHIZOAFFECTIVE SCHIZOPHRENIA, 
10 AND IN THE PART ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY 
11 DEFENSE, DR. RINDFLESH WRITES: 
12 MR. WILLIAMS' BEHAVIOR IN JAIL PRIOR TO 
13 BEING TREATED WITH MEDICATION INDICATES 
14 HE HAD A SIGNIFICANT MENTAL ILLNESS. I 
15 BELIEVE THIS ILLNESS VERY LIKELY TO HAVE 
16 BEEN PRESENT PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN THE 
17 JAIL, AND THEREFORE WAS PRESENT AT THE 
18 TIME OF HIS ARREST. 
19 EITHER BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER OR 
20 SCHIZOAFFECTIVE SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD HAVE 
21 A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MR. WILLIAMS' 
22 JUDGMENT. HE WOULD BE MORE EMOTIONAL 
23 LABILE, POSSIBLY PARANOID TO A SIGNIFICANT 
24 DEGREE, AND MUCH MORE REACTIVE. 
25 AS A RESULT, I BELIEVE HE MAY WELL BE ABLE 
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1 TO UTILIZE THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE. 
2 THAT WAS ON THE LAST PAGE OF HIS FOUR-PAGE REPORT. 
3 THE COURT: IF I CHOOSE TO SEND THIS GENTLEMAN 
4 TO THE STATE HOSPITAL, THEN OF COURSE THE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
5 THE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO-. 
6 MS. REMAL: NOT IF THE COURT RETAINS 
7 JURISDICTION, WHICH IS WHAT WE'RE ASKING. 
8 THE COURT: I'M SAYING THAT IF I DON'T RETAIN 
9 JURISDICTION, THEN THE BOARD OF PARDONS WOULD HAVE 
10 JURISDICTION, AND THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY 
11 AS FAR AS THIS IS CONCERNED. 
12 MS. REMAL: THEY WOULD. HE WOULD BE 
13 TRANSFERRED TO PRISON, AND IT'S NOT MY EXPECTATION THAT THEY 
14 WOULD IMMEDIATELY PAROLE HIM. 
15 I KNOW THAT IT SAYS IN THE REPORT THAT THERE IS 
16 SOME CAPACITY FOR TREATMENT AVAILABLE AT THE PRISON, AND I 
17 GUESS I AGREE WITH THAT IF WHAT YOU WANT TO SAY IS, YOU KNOW, 
18 SEEING A CASE WORKER OR A SOCIAL WORKER ONCE IN A WHILE, AND 
19 MEDICATIONS ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS, IS WHAT CAN BE 
20 PROVIDED. 
21 BUT I DON'T THINK ANY OF US KIDS OURSELVES THAT 
22 THE BEST TYPE OF MENTAL HEALTH IS AVAILABLE AT THE PRISON. I 
23 THINK WE ALL KNOW THAT THE BEST TYPE OF MENTAL HEALTH 
24 TREATMENT IS AVAILABLE A PLACE SUCH AS THE UTAH STATE 
25|| HOSPITAL, AND THEN FOLLOWED PROBABLY BY SIGNIFICANT 
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1 OUTPATIENT TREATMENT WHICH IS AVAILABLE AT PLACES SUCH AS 
2 VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH AND WITH PRIVATE DOCTORS AS WELL. 
3 MR. UPDEGROVE: YOUR HONOR, TO MAKE SURE THE 
4 RECORD IS CLEAR, THE COURT HAS TWO OPTIONS UNDER 77-16A-202. IF 
5 I MAY APPROACH. YOUR HONOR MIGHT WANT TO REVIEW (A) AND (B) 
6 TO MAKE SURE ITS CLEAR. 
7 THE COURT: WHAT DO THEY SAY, COUNSEL? DO YOU 
8 KNOW? 
9 MR. UPDEGROVE: YES. ONE IS THAT YOU COULD 
10 SEND HIM--AND THAT'S IF YOU SEND HIM TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
11 HUMAN SERVICES, THE STATE HOSPITAL AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
12 CORRECTIONS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS THEN HAS 
13 JURISDICTION; OR, YOU CAN SEND HIM TO THE STATE HOSPITAL FOR A 
14 PERIOD OF NO MORE THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AND RETAIN 
15 JURISDICTION AND THEN SENTENCE HIM. IS THAT CORRECT? 
16 MS. REMAL: I'M SORRY, I WASN'T LISTENING. 
17 MR. UPDEGROVE: THERE ARE TWO OPTIONS: TO THE 
18 STATE HOSPITAL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, THEN 
19 THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, IN WHICH CASE THE JUDGE LOSES 
20 JURISDICTION; OR, HE MAY SEND HIM TO HUMAN SERVICES, THE STATE 
21 HOSPITAL, FOR A MAXIMUM OF EIGHTEEN MONTHS, IN WHICH CASE THE 
22 JUDGE RETAINS JURISDICTION AND THEN SENTENCES HIM. 
23 MS. REMAL: YES, THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING. 
24 THE COURT: NOW, COUNSEL, STATE THAT NO. 1 
25 AGAIN. 
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1 MR. UPDEGROVE: IT SAYS-I BELIEVE THE SETTING IS 
2 SENDING HIM TO THE DEPARTMENT, BEING HUMAN SERVICES, TO THE 
3 STATE HOSPITAL, AND THEN THE STATE HOSPITAL WOULD SEND HIM TO 
4 THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, UDC. 
5 THE COURT: YOU DON'T THINK MY OPTION IS TO SEND 
6 HIM TO THE STATE PRISON WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THEY 
7 CONSIDER HIS MENTAL ILLNESS? 
8 MR. UPDEGROVE: WELL, I GUESS THAT'S A THIRD 
9 OPTION. 
10 MS. REMAL: THAT IS ACTUALLY ONE OF THE OPTIONS. 
11 TOO, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REMIND THE COURT-AND I THINK IF YOU 
12 LOOK BACK ON THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA FORM, IF I'M REMEMBERING 
13 RIGHT--I REMEMBER WRITING A FAIRLY LONG DESCRIPTION OF THE 
14 JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF THE STATE AND THE DEFENSE, AND PART 
15 OF THAT RECOMMENDATION I'M CERTAIN WAS THAT THE COURT 
16 RETAIN JURISDICTION IF IN FACT HE QUALIFIES FOR THE STATUS OF 
17 GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL SO THAT THE COURT WOULD THEN MAKE 
18 FURTHER DECISION ONCE HE RECEIVED THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF 
19 TREATMENT AS TO WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE AT 
20 THAT TIME. 
21 THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WISH TO STATE, 
22 SIR? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: NO, SIR. 
24 MS. REMAL: ONE MORE CLARIFICATION, YOUR HONOR, 
251 SO YOU'RE AWARE: IF THE COURT DOES RETAIN JURISDICTION, YOU 
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1 CONTINUE TO HAVE THE FULL RANGE OF DISCRETION IN TERMS OF 
2 WHAT SENTENCE THERE OUGHT TO BE AT THAT POINT. 
3 THE COURT: WELL, COUNSEL, OF COURSE WE'VE 
4 DISCUSSED THIS, AND HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME GOING OVER 
5 THE OPTIONS HERE. OF COURSE THE COURT HAS, AS COUNSEL HAS 
6 INDICATED, HAS DEALT WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL, AND I HAVE BEEN 
7 FAMILIAR WITH WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN THIS CRIME. I HAVE 
8 REVIEWED THE REPORTS, AND AS I SAID, I DON'T WANT TO BELITTLE IN 
9 ANY WAY THE EVALUATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN BEFORE ME AS FAR AS 
10 THE TWO. 
11 I READ WHAT RINDFLESH HAS SAID, AND ALSO I THINK 
12 THIS GENTLEMAN HAS HAD SOME MENTAL PROBLEMS. I DO NOT THINK 
13 THAT HE IS-AND I DON'T KNOW HOW TO WORD IT CORRECTLY, 
14 BECAUSE I'M NOT EDUCATED ENOUGH IN THE FIELD AS FAR AS MENTAL 
15 HEALTH IS CONCERNED-BUT I DON'T THINK THAT HE IS OF A 
16 SUFFICIENT CONDITION THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO STAND TRIAL IF IT 
17 HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO GO TO TRIAL. I THINK THAT HE DOES 
18 UNDERSTAND WHAT IS TAKING PLACE. I THINK THAT HE PROBABLY 
19 HAS MOMENTS WHEN HE'S OFF MEDICATION THAT HE IS AN IRRITABLE 
20 TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL AND ACTS OUT. 
21 I AM NOT PERSUADED THAT, WHILE UNDER 
22 MEDICATION, THAT THE DEFENDANT IS COMPLETELY IN CONTROL. 
23 NOW WHEN I SAY "COMPLETELY IN CONTROL," I THINK HE STILL HAS 
24 THE TENDENCY FOR HIS TEMPER TO BE VIOLENT AND TO CREATE A 
25 CRIMINAL SITUATION OR TO CREATE TRAUMA ON ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL 
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1 UPON HIM BECOMING IRRITATED IN SOME WAY. 
2 THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE COURT 
3 SHOULD NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER, THAT IT SHOULD 
4 BE IN THE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, FOR THEM TO HANDLE THE 
5 DEFENDANT AND DO WHAT IS NECESSARY AS FAR AS HIS 
6 REHABILITATION AND/OR PAYMENT FOR THE CRIMES WHICH HE HAS 
7 COMMITTED. 
8 THE COURT WOULD SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT, 
9 PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 
10 BEING A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY, TO INCARCERATION IN THE UTAH 
11 STATE PRISON FOR THE INDETERMINATE TERM OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS, 
12 COMMITMENT TO BE FORTHWITH. 
13 THE COURT WOULD ALSO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT, 
14 PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, FOR THE CRIME OF TAMPERING WITH A 
15 WITNESS, BEING A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY, TO INCARCERATION AT THE 
16 UTAH STATE PRISON FOR THE INDETERMINATE TERM OF ZERO TO FIVE 
17 YEARS, COMMITMENT TO BE FORTHWITH. 
18 THE COURT WOULD ALSO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT, 
19 PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, FOR THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF A 
20 PROTECTIVE ORDER, BEING A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, TO 
21 INCARCERATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON, OR THE SALT LAKE 
22 COUNTY JAIL, THAT BEING AT HIS OPTION, FOR A PERIOD ONE YEAR, 
23 COMMITMENT TO BE FORTHWITH. 
24 THE COURT WOULD ORDER THAT THE AGGRAVATED 
251 ASSAULT TERM, AND THE TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, WOULD RUN 
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1 CONSECUTIVELY; AND THE VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER 
2 WOULD RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE OTHER TWO. 
3 THE COURT WOULD FURTHER ORDER-MAKE THE 
4 RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRISON THAT OF COURSE--AND THE FILE 
5 WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THEM, BUT THAT THEY MAKE NOTE AS FAR 
6 AS THE MENTAL CONDITION AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO 
7 RECENT PSYCHOLOGISTS THAT DID INTERVIEW HIM AS TO THEIR 
8 DIFFERENCES AND THEIR OPINIONS AND THAT THE PRISON TAKE THE 
9 STEPS NECESSARY TO MEDICATE THIS INDIVIDUAL. 
10 AND OF COURSE THE COURT WOULD FURTHER 
11 RECOMMEND THAT IF THEY FIND THAT HE DOES HAVE PROBLEMS, THAT 
12 THEY DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO TREAT HIS MENTAL CONDITION AS 
13 FAR AS THE PRISON IS CONCERNED. 
14 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, IS THE COURT MAKING A 
15 FINDING THAT HE'S NOT QUALIFIED FOR THE STATUS OF GUILTY AND 
16 MENTALLY ILL? 
17 THE COURT: NO, I THINK THAT WOULD ENTER INTO IT 
18 IN THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
19 MS. REMAL: WELL, BUT PURSUANT TO THE 
20 EVALUATIONS, THE COURT THEN NEEDS TO MAKE A FINDING OF 
21 WHETHER YOU BELIEVE HE DOES OR DOES NOT QUALIFY AT THIS TIME. 
22 THE COURT: AND YOU'RE ASKING ME WHETHER I'M 
23 MAKING A FINDING IS HE QUALIFIED FOR THE STATE HOSPITAL, NO I AM 
24 NOT. 
25 MS. REMAL: WELL, I THINK FIRST THE COURT HAS TO 
25 tmiu 
1 MAKE A DECISION ABOUT WHETHER HE QUALIFIES FOR GUILTY AND 
2 MENTALLY ILL, AND THEN IF YOU FIND THAT HE DOES, THEN YOU HAVE 
3 TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND HIM TO THE 
4 STATE HOSPITAL PRIOR TO HIS GOING TO PRISON OR PRIOR TO HIS 
5 COMING BACK TO THIS COURT. 
6 THE COURT: AND I AM MAKING A FINDING, AND I 
7 THOUGHT I DID MAKE A FINDING, THAT I FELT THAT HE WAS MENTALLY 
8 ILL, BUT THAT HE IS NOT TO BE SENT TO THE HOSPITAL. HE'S BEING 
9 SENT TO THE STATE PRISON, AND THE STATE PRISON WOULD THEN 
10 RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER HIM. 
11 MS. REMAL: SO THE COURT DOES FIND THAT HE'S 
12 GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL BUT YOU'RE CHOOSING TO SEND HIM TO 
13 THE PRISON, NOT THE HOSPITAL. 
14 THE COURT: THAT IS CORRECT. 
15 MS. REMAL: AND THE COURT IS CHOOSING NOT TO 
16 RETAIN JURISDICTION. 
17 THE COURT: THAT IS CORRECT. 
18 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, COULD I ASK THE COURT 
19 TO RETAIN JURISDICTION OF THE MATTER FOR A WEEK SO THAT I 
20 MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER PERSONALLY 
21 WITH MS. BOYDEN? THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAVE LEARNED 
22 THAT THERE'S BEEN ANY CHANGE IN HER RECOMMENDATION, IS THIS 
23 MORNING WHEN MR.-. 
24 THE COURT: WHY DIDN'T YOU ASK THAT BEFORE I 
251 PRONOUNCED SENTENCE, COUNSEL? 
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1 MS. REMAL: BECAUSE UNTIL HE STEPPED UP AND 
2 READ THAT OFF OF THE PIECE OF PAPER ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AGO-. 
3 THE COURT: YOU HEARD IT THEN, WHY DIDN'T YOU 
4 MAKE THAT MOTION BEFORE I SENTENCED HIM? 
5 MS. REMAL: I GUESS I SHOULD HAVE, YOUR HONOR, 
6 AND I'M SORRY. BUT-. 
7 THE COURT: YES, I WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION FOR 
8 ONE WEEK IN THIS MATTER. 
9 MS. REMAL: THANK YOU. 
10 THE COURT: HE'S TO BE BROUGHT BACK, AND YOU 
11 MAY TALK TO MS. BOYDEN, AND I WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION TO 
12 CHANGE MY MIND IF I CHOOSE TO, IF I AM SO PERSUADED. 
13 MS. REMAL: THANK YOU. I APPRECIATE THAT. 
14 CLERK: DOES HE STILL GO TO THE PRISON? 
15 THE COURT: NO, NO. HOLD HIM; HOLD HIM FOR ONE 
16 WEEK. IT'S JUST LIKE A CONTINUANCE, AND I GRANTED A 
17 CONTINUANCE. 
18 (WHEREUPON, THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A 
19 CLOSE.) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 (TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY) 
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3 STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
4 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE THIRD 
6 JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
7 ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
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11 BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
12 TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
13 ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
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15 30TH DAY OF JUNE, 1995, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
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5 STATE OF UTAH, 
6 PLAINTIFF, 
7 VS. 
811 
PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS, 
911 CASE NO. 941900389 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
FINAL SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS 
ORIGINAL 
DEFENDANT. : HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 28TH DAY OF APRIL 
1995. CONTINUING IN THE 8:30 A.M. CRIMINAL CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF 
THE COURTS BUILDING, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
JUSTICE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
ANN BOYDEN. ESQUIRE. DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 363-7900 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
LISA J. REMAL. ESQUIRE. AND ROBERT L. STEELE. 
ESQUIRE. SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 424 EAST 500 
SOUTH, SUITE 300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 TELEPHONE FftED 
APPEARING WITH AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT. 
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INDEX 
APRIL 28, 1995 
ACTIVITY LINE PAGE 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS BY MS. BOYDEN 17 2 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS BY MR. STEELE 1 5 
SENTENCING BY THE COURT 16 7 
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1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
2 HAD IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE 
3 DEFENDANT:) 
4 THE COURT: WHO'S NEXT? 
5 BAILIFF: THE WILLIAMS MATTER. 
6 THE COURT: STATE VERSUS PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS. 
7 NOW THIS GENTLEMAN HAS BEEN SENTENCED. THIS IS THE TIME FOR 
8 SENTENCING, BUT THIS GENTLEMAN HAS BEEN SENTENCED, AND YOU 
9 WANTED TO REVIEW SOMETHING WITH THE STATE, AND I GAVE YOU 
10 THAT WEEK TO DO THAT. 
11 MS. REMAL: YES, YOUR HONOR. I BELIEVE THAT MS. 
12 BOYDEN HAS A RECOMMENDATION TO MAKE TO THE COURT AT THIS 
13 TIME, AND MR. STEELE ALSO IS GOING TO SPEAK TO THE ISSUE. 
14 MS. BOYDEN: GO AHEAD, MR. STEELE. OR DO YOU 
15 WANT ME TO GO FIRST? 
16 MR. STEELE: THAT'S FINE. 
17 MS. BOYDEN: JUDGE, THANK YOU. THIS CASE HAS 
18 CAUSED ME A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN, JUDGE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO 
19 TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO EXPLAIN WHAT THOSE CONCERNS ARE. 
20 BACK DURING THE NEGOTIATION STAGE, AND AT THE 
21 CHANGE OF PLEA, THE DEFENDANT APPEARED TO BE CLEARLY 
22 MENTALLY ILL AND AT THE POINT OF EXHIBITING SUCH BIZARRE 
23 BEHAVIORS THAT AT THE TIME OF THE CHANGE OF PLEA, MY 
24 RECOMMENDATION WAS THAT THE DEFENDANT GO TO THE STATE 
25|| HOSPITAL. 
2
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1 AND I THINK HE REACHED THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT OF 
2 THE STATE HOSPITAL, I WAS STILL CONCERNED ENOUGH THAT I FELT 
3 THAT WE NEEDED A FULL YEAR WITH NO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN 
4 THE JAIL. AND THOSE WERE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS. 
5 THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A CHANGE OF PLEA AND 
6 WAS SENT TO THE STATE HOSPITAL, AND EVALUATED THERE, AND 
7 THOSE EVALUATIONS, JUDGE, INDICATED AT LEAST IN SOME CASES 
8 THAT THE DEFENDANT MAY BE EXAGGERATING SYMPTOMS IF NOT 
9 OUTRIGHT MALINGERING. 
16 TO ME, THOSE EVALUATIONS WERE A CHANGED 
11 CIRCUMSTANCE, AND THEY GAVE ME ENOUGH CONCERN THAT I 
12 CHANGED MY RECOMMENDATION AND AGREED TO SUBMIT IT ON THE 
13 PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, WHICH WAS ASKING FOR PRISON. 
14 IT WAS AT THAT POINT, AT THE LAST HEARING, WHEN 
15 THE LAST FRIDAY'S HEARING WAS HELD, THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL 
16 ASKED FOR SOME TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME, AND THIS COURT GRANTED 
17 IT. 
18 MS. REMAL AND I HAVE SPOKEN AT LENGTH ABOUT 
19 THESE MATTERS, JUDGE. I ALSO HAVE SPOKEN WITH THE VICTIM IN 
20 THIS CASE, MS. FLOYD. I HAVE RE-EVALUATED AND RE-READ THE 
21 REPORTS AND EVALUATIONS, AND I HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM 
22 MS. REMAL THAT WAS WRITTEN BY DR. GREGORY ADDRESSING MANY 
23 OF THESE MALINGERING CONCERNS THAT I HAD. 
24 NOW JUDGE, I MUST ADMIT, THIS MORNING I'M STILL 
25 SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AND STILL VERY CONCERNED. 
000301 
1 DR. GREGORY'S LETTER IN MANY WAYS ASSUAGED 
2 MANY OF THE CONCERNS I HAD ABOUT MALINGERING CLAIMS, BUT 
3 THEN AT THE SAME TIME, WHEN I TALKED WITH MS. FLOYD, THE 
4 VICTIM, THOSE CONCERNS ARE FLAMED AGAIN AND I HAVE THE SAME 
5 CONCERNS. 
6 NOW THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH IS, AND THIS 
7 COURT KNOWS, AND WE ALL KNOW, THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
8 RECOMMENDATION, MY RECOMMENDATION, MS. FLOYD'S 
9 RECOMMENDATION, AP&P'S RECOMMENDATION ARE JUST THAT: 
10 RECOMMENDATIONS. AND THE COURT OBVIOUSLY IS GOING TO HAVE 
11 TO ULTIMATELY SIFT THROUGH THIS CONFUSION AND COME UP WITH 
12 AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE. 
13 BUT I THINK AGAIN, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE IS 
14 STILL THIS CONFLICTING CLAIM ABOUT MALINGERING, THAT PERHAPS 
15 THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THAT IS FOR THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE 
16 OPTION IN 77-16A-202 SUBSECTION (B), THAT THE DEFENDANT BE SENT 
17 BACK TO THE STATE HOSPITAL FOR A LONG ENOUGH PERIOD OF 
18 OBSERVATION AND TREATMENT THAT THESE ISSUES OF MALINGERING 
19 OR EXAGGERATING CAN BE SIFTED THROUGH SO THAT THE COURT HAS 
20 A BASIS FOR MAKING THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE. 
21 THE LAW DOES ALLOW FOR THAT, AND PERHAPS THAT 
22 IS THE BEST WAY. UNDER THAT SECTION, YOUT) STILL BE RETAINING 
23 JURISDICTION, AND THE DEFENDANT, AT THE END OF A MORE 
24 EXTENSIVE TIME SPENT AT THE STATE HOSPITAL, WOULD BE RETURNED 
25 FOR RE-SENTENCING. 
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1 MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, FIRST OF ALL YOU WERE 
2 PROVIDED WITH THE SAME LETTER THAT MS. BOYDEN SPOKE ABOUT 
3 FROM DR. GREGORY. HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT 
4 THAT? 
5 THE COURT: I HAVEN'T RECEIVED ANY LETTERS SINCE 
6 LAST WEEK. 
7 MR. STEELE: IT WAS GIVEN TO YOU SEVERAL MINUTES 
8 AGO. I'M NOT SURE IT WAS IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS TO WHAT IT WAS. I 
9 GAVE IT TO THE BAILIFF. 
10 THE COURT: YOU GAVE IT TO THE BAILIFF? 
11 MR. STEELE: YES. 
12 THE COURT: MR. FULLMER, DID YOU RECEIVE A 
13 LETTER? 
14 BAILIFF: THAT'S THE PAPER I SET THERE WITH ROBERT 
15 STEELE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS. 
16 THE COURT: IT'S STILL THERE I GUESS. 
17 MS. REMAL: I-. 
18 THE COURT: I HAVEN'T SEEN IT. 
19 MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, WHAT I WANT TO TELL 
20 THE COURT IS WHAT I HAVE SEEN OVER THE YEAR OF SEEING PATRICK, 
21 NEARLY WEEKLY. IN APRIL TO JUNE OF'94,1 HAD A WEEKLY 
22 CONVERSATION WITH PATRICK, AND WE WERE PREPARING THE CASE. 
23 WE ARGUED MOTIONS BEFORE THIS COURT, HAD NO TROUBLE 
24 COMMUNICATING WITH HIM, AND THINGS WERE PROCEEDING IN AN 
25 ORDERLY FASHION. 
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1 WE HIRED DR. GUMAU TO GIVE US SOME FEEDBACK 
2 ON PATRICK'S LIFE. THERE WAS SOME INDICATION OF DEPRESSION AND 
3 INVOLVEMENT WITH THIS CRIME. IN JULY, THE MEDICATION HE WAS 
4 TAKING, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN TAKING PRIOR TO THE CRIME, AND 
5 WENT OFF OF, BECAME NEARLY TOXIC FOR HIM. THAT'S THE ONLY 
6 WAY I CAN DESCRIBE IT. I'M NOT SAYING THAT PARTICULARLY IN ANY 
7 WAY, BUT HE JUST BECAME INCREDIBLY AGITATED AND UNABLE TO 
8 FOCUS AND UNABLE TO SLEEP. HE WAS QUICKLY TAKEN OFF THAT 
9 MEDICATION AND WENT REALLY DOWNHILL OVERNIGHT. IT WAS VERY, 
10 VERY DRAMATIC AS A SITUATION. 
11 I TALKED TO PEOPLE AT THE JAIL WHO SAID-WHO 
12 GRABBED BOTH MS. REMAL AND I SAID, "HELP US OUT, WHAT'S GOING 
13 ON?" 
14 WE QUICKLY ASKED THE COURT TO APPOINT 
15 COMPETENCY EVALUATORS, DR. NIELSEN AND DR. GREGORY, WHO SAW 
16 PATRICK DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME. DR. HUMMEL ALSO GAVE ME A 
17 CALL, WHO IS OVER THE JAIL MENTAL HEALTH UNIT, AND MENTAL 
18 HEALTH PERSONNEL WERE CLEARLY UPSET AND WORRIED ABOUT 
19 WHAT WAS HAPPENING. 
20 WHAT I SAW WAS, AND PATRICK TOLD ME, THAT HE 
21 DOWN TO ABOUT AN HOUR OF TWO OF SLEEP AT NIGHT. THAT WAS 
22 CONFIRMED BY TALKING TO THE JAILERS. 
23 HE WAS AGITATED, RAMBLING, UNABLE TO REALLY 
24 FOCUS. THERE WERE ALL KINDS OF REQUESTS MADE OF ME THAT 
251 WERE OUT OF THE ORDINARY. 
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1 HE HAD A FEAR OF HIS FOOD BEING TAMPERED WITH, 
2 AND HE ACTUALLY MAILED ME SOME OF THE JAIL FOOD. HE HAD A 
3 FEAR OF BEING INFECTED WITH DISEASE BY THE JAIL AND MAILED ME 
4 SOME PROOF OF THAT, OR HANDED ME SOME PROOF OF THAT. 
5 I MEAN THESE THINGS-THERE WAS SOME BASIS IN 
6 REALITY, BUT IT WAS-HIS THOUGHT PROCESS WAS REALLY THE 
7 PROBLEM. HE TURNED IT INTO A PARANOID STATE. 
8 HE WAS THEN PUT ON MEDICATION, AND IT TOOK 
9 SEVERAL MONTHS, BUT STEP BY STEP HE BEGAN TO FEEL BETTER, AND 
10 HE WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE, "I FEEL MUCH BETTER THAN I DID." 
11 AND IT TOOK A WHILE TO GET HIM BACK TO 
12 FUNCTIONING. AND THAT IS WHAT I HAVE SEEN HAPPEN. 
13 I'M NOT A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL, BUT I DO 
14 NOT THINK WHAT I SAW WAS MALINGERING. 
15 THE COURT: WELL, I HAVE BEFORE ME DR. WOOTEN, 
16 DR. WILLIAMS, DR. NIELSEN, AND VICKY GREGORY AND I INDICATED 
17 LAST WEEK THAT I DO NOT WISH TO BELITTLE THE CREDIBILITY OF 
18 ANY OF THESE WITNESSES-THESE EVALUATORS, BUT NONE OF THEM IS 
19 A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL AND CAN GIVE ME, REALLY, WHAT I FEEL 
20 WOULD BE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO CONVINCE THIS COURT AS TO 
21 THE CONDITION OF THIS GENTLEMAN. 
22 THEY'RE SPLIT. THEY'RE DIVIDED. THEY'RE NOT 
23 UNIFORM ON THEIR RECOMMENDATION AS FAR AS THIS GENTLEMAN IS 
24 CONCERNED. 
25 AND IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE CRIME THAT 
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1 WAS INVOLVED HERE, THIS COURT DOES NOT FEEL INCLINED TO 
2 PROCEED AS YOU ARE RECOMMENDING TO ME. 
3 I AM GOING TO STAND ON THE SENTENCE WHICH I 
4 IMPOSED ON HIM LAST WEEK, AND HAVE THAT CARRIED OUT. 
5 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, WOULD THE COURT 
6 RECONSIDER THE CONSECUTIVE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT TO THE 
7 PRISON. LAST WEEK YOU INDICATED THAT THE TWO ZERO TO FIVE 
8 YEAR SENTENCES WOULD RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO EACH OTHER, AND 
9 THAT THE CLASS A WOULD RUN CONCURRENTLY. 
10 WOULD THE COURT CONSIDER AT LEAST MAKING ALL 
11 OF THEM CONCURRENT WITH EACH OTHER, LEADING IT UP TO THE 
12 BOARD OF PARDONS? CLEARLY UP TO FIVE YEARS, THEY WOULD HAVE 
13 THAT TIME TO DEAL WITH MR. WILLIAMS AND MAKE A DETERMINATION 
14 OF WHEN PAROLE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. 
15 THE COURT: NO, I WOULDN'T. I WOULD DECLINE TO 
16 CHANGE THAT. I'VE THOUGHT THAT THROUGH, TOO, AND I REMEMBER 
17 AT THE TIME THERE WERE SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL SITUATIONS, AND I 
18 FELT IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO DO IT THE WAY I DID IT. I THOUGHT IT 
19 THROUGH AS FAR AS THE TWO CONSECUTIVES AND THE ONE 
20 CONCURRENT, AND I WOULD STAND ON THAT. THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
21 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND 
22 TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS THAT MR. WILLIAMS RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 
23 TIME THAT HE HAS SERVED? IT'S BEEN OVER FOURTEEN MONTHS AT 
24 THIS POINT. 
25|| THE COURT: YES, YES. 
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MS. REMAL: HE HAS BEEN INCARCERATED FOR THAT 
TIME. 
THE COURT: YES, I WOULD. 
MS. REMAL: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. THANK YOU, SIR. 
(WHEREUPON, THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A 
CLOSE.) 
(TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY) 
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3 STATE OF UTAH ) 
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4 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE THIRD 
6 JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
7 ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
8 STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET 
9 FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
10 REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 9, 
11 BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
12 TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
13 ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
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